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Highlights 
 An IoT system connecting sensors to any PC in the world is proposed. 
 System deploys data security, routing security, key management and cloud security. 
 Fast time and low energy consumption throughout the system. 
 
Abstract: The Internet of Things (IoT) has been expanding in recent years with advancements in technologies, 
techniques and devices. This expansion has led to several different applications in the medical, civil, marine, 
military and domestic domains. Each of these domains have different requirements and challenges, with one 
common denominator: data security. Data security is an important aspect for any IoT network, however, in modern 
IoT systems simple data security may be not sufficient. This paper looks at a secure end-to-end IoT solution that 
allows wireless sensors/devices to connect to any PC in the world while guaranteeing data and network security. 
The scheme proposed in this paper can protect an IoT solution against several attacks like data breach, Denial of 
Service (DoS) and unauthorized access. Results obtained show that the technologies implemented, or used are 
superior in terms of time and energy consumption when compared to their counterparts in previously published 
works. 
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1. Introduction 
There has been considerable advancement in the industry of IoT and Wireless sensor networks (WSN) for 
different purposes and applications. Each domain has different specifications, purpose, challenges and security 
requirements. For instance, a patient monitoring system [1,2] may require higher security than a smart parking 
solution. This is because a patient monitoring system handles patient data and sensor commands, which may be 
misused by compromising data, denying service and gaining unauthorized access to the network. Keeping this in 
mind, this paper focusses on securing a patient monitoring system for different components and aspects of the 
network, thereby providing the system with confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA triad) [3]. 
 Figure 1 illustrates the proposed system model for patient monitoring based on an end-to-end secure IoT. 
Here, several communication standards are used for the different devices. The standards are Message Queuing 
Telemetry Transport (MQTT) [4], universal asynchronous receiver/transmitter (UART) and RIME [5]. The 
devices are:  
(1) Subscribed PC: a PC subscribed to a particular MQTT topic through the cloud network. This PC runs the 
Linux operating system Ubuntu 14.04 LTS and a custom python program to communicate with the cloud.  
 (2) Intel Edison Gateway [6]: This device runs the Debian (Ubilinux) OS and a python program to communicate 
with the cloud/sensors. 
(3) Openmote [7]: This device runs the Contiki OS [8] and is used for the WSN side of the network. 
 The advantages of using a secure IoT system for patient monitoring systems are: (1) It allows internet 
connectivity for data to be send anywhere across the world. (2) The hospital staff / doctor can take immediate 
action if required. For example, sending an ambulance or administering a particular drug dose. (3) Patients have 
mobility as they can get their vitals checked while on-the-go, and (4) the confidence of the patients and the hospital 
staff in the use of these systems is increased because it is secure against data breach, denial of service and 
unauthorized access. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, current solutions to the different aspects of IoT 
systems and key management are discussed. In Section 3, the overview of the IoT system, devices used, 
communication standards employed, and security technologies integrated are outlined. Additionally, the 
applicability of the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA) triad to the proposed IoT system is discussed. 
In Section 4, several key management techniques like HMAC-based Key Derivation Function (HKDF) and 
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) are defined and used in the proposed system.  Results are provided for a 
real-world implementation of the IoT system shown in Fig. 1.  In Section 5, the approaches for seeding a pseudo 
random number generator (PRNG) are discussed. Finally, the conclusion summarises the whole system with focus 
on security and the advantages it offers. 
2. Related Work 
Before proceeding into the current solutions related to our system presented in this paper, we will outline ‘Our 
System’ as mentioned in Table I. This refers to the system presented in Fig. 1 i.e. an end-to-end secure IoT system. 
The security technologies that are involved here are ECDH and HKDF algorithms, and AES Galois Counter Mode 
(AES-GCM 256) cipher. Each of these are described in detail in Section 4, where the corresponding experiments 
were carried out, and the results thus obtained from that section are combined and integrated into Table I under 
the ‘Our System’ heading. This is done for easier comparison with the other solutions provided in this section.  
Now, moving the focus to the other current solutions available, there have been several different works that 
review the systems related to IoT/WSN fields. These systems may be harmed through different security attacks 
and there has been considerable amount of research into these systems and their defence mechanisms. For example 
the authors in [9] formulate a secure data transmission protocol, and discuss issues relating to integration of 
security in healthcare-based WSNs. In [10] the authors provide a lightweight and secure system for medical 
monitoring. The implementation makes use of limited resources hardware, and secures the data transmission 
through the system. Additionally, their implementation provides access control for authentication purposes. Other 
security related healthcare WSN applications can be found in [11–13]. 
Moreover, several works have tried to solve the security challenges associated with the IoT/WSN field. 
Reference [14], provides an overview on the challenges of IoT applications in smart grids related to security and 
privacy. In [15], the authors provide a key management architecture for IoT with resource constraints. They 
implement an IoT system with a client, a trusted authority, and a resource server to evaluate the key derived from 
their key management scheme. They have made use of the Contiki OS and the CC2538DK [16]. Their findings 
show that a complete handshake duration required to derive a key is 511.65ms to 711.11ms, compared to the key 
derivation schemes: HKDF and ECDH, used in our system which take 1.22ms and 682.6ms respectively. In 
addition, the energy consumed by the process in [15] ranges from 200 to 1000 μJ. In contrast, the key derivation 
processes in our system i.e. HKDF and ECDH schemes consume 49μJ and 21.49mJ respectively, see Table I. 
 
In [17], the authors compare and contrast  existing security schemes for wireless sensor networks (WSN), and 
introduce a new hybrid scheme. This scheme makes use of multiple key management concepts like trusted third 
party (TTP), node joining / revocation, and storage of keys. In contrast, the scheme presented in this paper does 
not require a TTP as authentication is provided through a hash-based mechanism discussed in our previous work 
 in [1]. Moreover, the scheme in [17] uses RSA to encrypt and decrypt a newly generated key. This can be 
expensive in the application layer, (up to 2 seconds). The usage of ECDH in our scheme to generate new keys 
takes only 682.6ms, Table I.  
In [18], the authors introduced an optimised implementation of the NIST P-192 Elliptic Curve, running on an 
ATMega 128 Processor at 7.37MHz. The ECDH scheme implemented in [18] consumes 12.08 x 106 to 12.86 x 
106 clock cycles, and 42mJ of energy. In contrast, the ECDH scheme used here, which is based on the ECC library 
of contiki [19], uses the NIST P-256 Elliptic Curve, running on the CC2538 SoC [20] with a clock frequency of 
16MHz. This results in a consumption of 10.92 x 106 clock cycles, and 21.49mJ of energy as shown in Table I. 
Thereby showing an improvement of 1.16 to 1.94 x 106 clock cycles and 20.51mJ in energy consumption. 
Reference [21] proposes new seeding techniques as a strong foundation for securing an IoT system. They 
provide in-depth detail on leveraging sensor data for providing secure seeds for a random number generator 
(RNG), which includes the Blum-Blum-Shub scheme, Washed + Rinsed scheme, Hashing algorithm and raw 
accelerometer data. In the proposed system, a real-time clock and accelerometer readings are used. These were 
timed and it was found that the latter is faster than the former by more than 80 times.  
Finally, work related to HKDF, can be found in [22]. Here, the authors use the key derivation function for 
generating keys in an LTE network with the help of SHA-256 and HMAC. The paper lacks any timing or energy 
consumption measurements. In addition, the authors in [23] explain the security associated with HKDF and 
provide extensive comparisons with other key derivation functions. 
3. System Model 
3.1. Platform: Openmote 
In the system presented here the openmote platform [24] is used. The main reason for using openmote is that 
it has sufficient RAM and ROM: 32kB and 512kB, and has hardware accelerators available for SHA-256, ECC 
and AES. This is useful as it speeds up the time required for computations for each of these security schemes, see 
Table II. In addition, the openmote platform supports multiple Operating Systems, including the Contiki OS [8], 
which is used in this work. 
3.2. Platform: Intel Edison 
       In addition, the Intel Edison Arduino Breakout Board is utilised. The board is useful as it provides features 
like 1 GB RAM, and a USB Type A connector. The former is useful to facilitate simultaneous MQTT and UART 
connections, and the latter is useful for connecting the Openmote BaseStation directly to the Edison board. In 
addition, the Debian ubilinux is used instead of the default Yocto Linux. This is done to provide more freedom 
during programming, and for certain features like the paho MQTT client for python. 
3.3. Platform: PC 
 A PC is used for receiving the encrypted data and decrypting it using AES-GCM 256, which is based on 
modifications to the library provided by the author in [25]. 
3.4. Platform: Cloud 
Finally, the services of the eclipse paho project from [26] are also used. The MQTT running over this public 
server makes use of the 1883 unencrypted port. In the future it is planned to use the encrypted port 8883 in 
conjunction with transport layer security (TLS).  
3.5. Overview: 
The system model used defines an end-to-end system that is capable of connecting Internet of Things (IoT) 
enabled sensors on a patient to any PC in the world while avoiding direct access to the sensors from the internet. 
This technique is advantageous because it mitigates unauthorized IP-access of the sensors or routers from the 
internet, which may lead to various security attacks [27,28] while keeping the sensors, and routers connected to 
the internet.  
Now, the actual sensors attached to the patient can be of any type like ECG, EEG, Pulse Oximeter, and so on. 
This is because the system model is structured such that it will work on any sensed data coming from the above-
mentioned sensors attached to the sensor nodes (openmotes). This data is digital in nature as it has already been 
 converted by the analog-digital converter (ADC) of the sensor nodes (openmotes). For testing purposes, the system 
sensor nodes (openmotes) sense the temperature, humidity, and light (LUX) values with their on-board sensors. 
Additionally, when this data is being transmitted across the network each packet can carry a payload (data) of 
maximum size equal to 80 bytes. This is more than enough because each sensed data arising from the sensors may 
be in the order of a few bits. 
As mentioned previously the architecture comprises of three communication standards i.e. MQTT, UART and 
RIME, see Fig. 1. MQTT provides a lightweight publish/subscribe model for communication between the 
Gateway and a Subscribed PC (PC subscribed to a MQTT Topic). It also has a small overhead for message 
transport, provides Quality of Service (QoS), and makes use of TCP/IP for network connectivity [4]. RIME, on 
the other hand, is a layered communication stack with low complexity of implementation for sensor network 
protocols, and low memory footprint (100-226 bytes) [5]. This is ideal for the wireless sensors’ side of the system 
due to their resource constraints. Additionally, the RIME communication standard makes use of the chameleon 
architecture, which sits on top of the IEEE 802.15.4 MAC layer, which is related to the ZigBee specification as 
mentioned in  [5]. 
Now, moving towards the work flow of the system as illustrated in Fig. 2, the system follows the following steps: 
(1) The subscribed PC sends a ‘start’ command to the BS in the IoT/WSN network. 
(2) The BS initiates  secure on-demand routing protocol [1,13] to set up a route with Router R. 
(3) Following this, ECDH phase I commences (Section 5). 
(4) Router R broadcasts a ‘Hello’ packet with its public key (Qr) to the sensors.  
(5) Following the cluster head (CH) elections [1][29], the second phase of the ECDH (Section 5) commences. 
This results in the generation of a shared key (Ks) between the router and the sensors. 
(6) Now, the sensors commence data sampling, Fig 3.  
 
(7) Each sensor i, encrypts its sampled data Di using AES-GCM 256bit 
{Di}Ks ¦¦ Ts                                                   (1) 
 Where Ks is the session key, and Ts is the generated authentication tag. 
(8) Each sensor’s encrypted data is aggregated at the CH, and send to Router R. The aggregation takes place in 
the following manner: 
{D1}Ks ¦¦ Ts ¦ {D2}Ks ¦¦ Ts ¦ … ¦ {Dn}Ks ¦¦ Ts  represented as [{Di}Ks ¦¦ Ts]n in Fig 3.          (2) 
Here, n is the number of sensors in the cluster 
(9) Following this, Router R decrypts the data and verifies its authentication tag. 
(10) R then encrypts this aggregated data with a pre-loaded key Km, and sends it to the BS. 
{D1 ¦¦ D2 ¦ …. ¦ Dn}Km ¦¦ Tm                                                                                                     (3) 
(11) The BS, forwards this to the PC via the gateway. 
(12) Finally, the PC verifies tag Tm, and decrypts the encrypted data using AES-GCM with the pre-loaded key 
Km. 
 
As shown, data / commands travel from different entities (sensors, routers, Gateway, Cloud, and PC), and 
through different communication channels (RIME, Internet, and UART). This raises security concerns that call 
for extensive measures in order to safeguard the system, the data, and the people involved. The different security 
measures implemented in our system are: (see Fig. 1.) 
(1) Confidentiality: AES-GCM 256 bit [30]. 
(2) Data Integrity: Using AES-GCM’s one-pass authentication. 
(3) Entity Authentication between the BS and the Router R using our HASH-based scheme [1]. Authentication 
between PC and the Gateway G using pre-loaded keys. 
 (4) Key Management using ECDH [31] and HKDF [32] between the Router R and the sensors, and between the 
PC and Router R, respectively. 
These measures, and their usage in our system are described in the following section (Section 3.6). 
3.6. Security Overview (CIA Triad) 
Confidentiality refers to the protection of data from unauthorized users or malicious individuals, the lack of 
which can have serious repercussions on the smooth working of a system. In the system presented here, 
confidentiality is provided by making use of the AES - Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) [30] with 256-bit security. 
This mode has several advantages over other cipher modes [33], such as: 
(1) Accepts arbitrary length initial-vector (IV). 
(2) Provides one-pass data authentication. 
(3) Can be used as a stand-alone MAC or incremental MAC. 
The authors in [33] show how the GCM mode is secure after using the above mentioned features. Thereby, 
increasing our confidence in the usage of this mode for the system presented.  
Integrity refers to the protection/detection of data from any modification. To provide this, the system makes 
use of the previously mentioned, AES-GCM 256. This approach is useful as it allows for one-pass data 
authentication with confidentiality. 
Authentication refers to the authorisation/verification of an entity that wishes to join the network. It also 
allowing a network device to verify the authenticity of a data/packet sender. This is achieved in two parts: 
(1) BS to router R: a SHA-256 hash-based scheme is implemented. This scheme helps the router to verify the 
authenticity of the BS [1]. 
(2) PC to the BS via Gateway: Currently, a preloaded-key Km is used with a randomly generated salt S. However, 
in the future it is planned to use the transport layer security (TLS) authentication protocol as this can help 
prevent tampering, message forgery and eavesdropping [34]. TLS has yet to be implemented in the proposed 
system. 
4. Key management 
All the above processes are fruitless if the keys are not updated securely. This requires the use of key 
management, which is important for the wireless network in the implemented system as it may be exposed to 
different types of security attacks. So, the key management implemented here allows for the keys between two 
parties to be updated without disclosure of any associated private data. This update ensures that any compromised 
key may not be used to attack the system.  
The process of key management entails the following parameters: key generation, key updates, and key 
revocation. This section focuses primarily on the key update process between: (1) Router R and the Cluster of 
sensors S, and (2) Subscribed PC P and Router R. 
Following notations are used in this section: 
a) Ks: Session key generated between R and S 
b) Km: Pre-loaded master key between the P and R 
c) Km_new: New Key generated between P and R 
Ks key is used to encrypt and authenticate data between the router R and cluster of Sensors S using the AES-GCM 
256 cipher. This key is always generated using the ECDH algorithm. Km key between the P and router R is pre-
loaded for first time use. Following this, it is always updated using the HKDF mechanism, which results in a new 
session key Km_new 
4.1. Key Updates 
The key management process is implemented in the system in two phases: 
 (1) Router R to the Cluster of sensors S: Here, the key management process encompasses key generation, and 
key update, with usage of the ECDH algorithm [31]. When compared to its counterparts like RSA [35], 
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is used to ensure that the key size is small [36], and implementation is 
resource efficient [37].  Elliptic curve NIST P-256 curve (secp256r1) is selected as the curve, as it is one of 
the NIST recommended curves [38] in the 256 bit ECC family. This curve is generated from random values, 
and is implemented in the ECC library provided in Contiki [19]. 
 
Following is a brief explanation of the implemented mechanism: 
Phase 1 
Phase 2 
a) Router R calculates shared secret (Ks) = kr.Qc (Fig. 4, point 5. of Router):  
 
Here Since Qc = kc.G, therefore Ks can also be written as kr.kc.G     (4) 
 
b) Sensors S calculate shared secret (Ks) = kc.Qr (Fig. 4, point 5. of Cluster of Sensors):  
Here Since Qr = kr.G, therefore Ks can also be written as kc.kr.G      (5) 
Now, Eq. 4 and Eq. 5 show that the shared secret (Ks) is same for both parties. This is because the scalar 
multiplication (.) observes the commutative law of mathematics. Thereby making kr.kc.G and kc.kr.G equal. 
Therefore, it is clear that the new session key generated Ks is same on both sides (from Fig. 4, Eq. 4, and Eq. 
5). This session key is used to encrypt data from the sensors to the router using AES-GCM 256 bit, and is 
periodically updated. This update time is set arbitrarily and can be adjusted to suit the needs of the 
application. 
(2) Router R to PC side: This part of the network implements the HKDF process in accordance with the IETF 
standard RFC 5869 [32], and the HMAC process in accordance with the IETF standard RFC 2104 [39]. In 
these implementations, the SHA hardware accelerator for cc2538 in the openmote is used, and python 
programming language in the PC is used. 
Now, the reason for using HKDF instead of ECDH is that the latter would have to be implemented across 
different platforms running different operating systems, and the exchange would have to take place through 
the cloud using MQTT (see Fig 1). This would put an excessive workload on the IoT router R that is already 
handling the ECDH process with the cluster of sensors S.  
Moving on, the designated router R updates its key using HKDF, when it receives an ‘update’ command 
from the subscribed PC via. the Gateway (using MQTT protocol) as shown in Fig. 5. The process results in 
a new key Km_new generated on both sides (PC and R) without sending any information over the network. 
This saves energy because radio transmissions are reduced as compared to ECDH, see Table III. However, 
the disadvantage is that if the router or the PC is compromised, then the subsequent keys generated may be 
compromised. So, in-order to reduce this likelihood one may change the ‘opad’, and ‘ipad’ values used in 
HMAC to secret values instead of the general ones provided in the HMAC RFC 2104 [39]. In this fashion, 
an attacker may not be able to launch attacks that analyse the cipher text, unless they have knowledge of 
both the ‘opad’ and the ‘ipad’. 
 
 
 
4.2. Results 
This section presents the results associated with some of the key management techniques mentioned 
previously, and other cryptographic measures used in our system. These are compared with each other and/or with 
other systems as mentioned in their respective tables.  
 Table III presents analysis of different key management techniques in our presented system, in TinyECC [40] 
implementation, and in the system presented in [18]. From the table, it can be deduced that the non-optimized 
ECDH implemented in contiki is more efficient than the one presented in TinyECC without optimizations enabled 
[40], and also to the one presented in [18]. 
 
Additionally, from Table III it is seen that HKDF outperforms ECDH in terms of time and energy. This is 
because the HKDF makes use of only HMAC as compared to ECDH that makes use of expensive operations like 
scalar multiplication and radio communications. However, when considering security, ECDH outperforms HKDF. 
This is because the HKDF makes use of pre-loaded session key, as compared to ECDH, which generates the first 
session key through a Diffie-Hellman Exchange. 
Table IV presents the measurements for the AES-GCM 256 library in Contiki OS. The results show that this 
is approximately 80 times faster when compared to the AES-CBC 128 and AES-CBC 256 libraries in  Waspmotes  
[17,41]. This shows the superior technologies and techniques used in the presented system provide security with 
fast time and low current consumption. 
 
5. Pseudo Random number generator Seeding (PRNGS) 
The previously mentioned key management schemes require a strong foundation. This may be achieved by 
strengthening the core random number generation process as it is used for initial random number generation at the 
BS [1] and for private key generation in ECDH. Therefore, in this system several techniques are discussed that 
can be used for the improvement of these processes. 
Notations used in this section: 
a) RTIMER_NOW: Current time in system ticks. 
b) srand: ‘C’ library function from <stdlib.h>. This is used to initialise the PRNG with a seed. 
c) RAND_MAX: Maximum value the random function (rand()) can return, and is equal to 2147483647. 
 
Table V examines four scenarios with different initial seeding, and rand() function range. From the table, it is 
deduced that scenarios 3 and 4 are disregarded due to too much time consumption (261 ms), and low variation of 
power-values respectively. However, Scenario 3 is still included in the following test for further comparison 
because it results in changes to output random numbers, visible to the naked eye, unlike Scenario 4.  
The following test measures Scenarios 1, 2, and 3 using the NIST’s statistical test suite for random and pseudo 
random number generators [42]. The number of input bit stream length n is 10000, and the significance level α is 
set to 0.01, which means that 1 in every 1000 scenario may fail. Therefore, any proportion-value (P-value) ≥ 0.01 
means the PRNG has passed that statistical test. Table VI shows the results with the P-value shown in terms of 
percentage. From the table, it is inferred that Scenario 2 performs better than the other scenarios even though it 
uses a PRNG. This is because the accelerometer in Scenario 3 has limited range and resolution, and the power 
consumption in Scenario 4 does not vary considerably, as mentioned previously. Moreover, the time consumed 
by Scenarios 1 and 2 is considerably less when compared to Scenario 3 (≈ 1/500). 
 
Additionally, Scenario 2 performs better compared to the Raw Data and Secure Hash algorithm approach used 
in [21]. However, it falls behind when compared to the Washed+Rinsed technique and Blum-Blum-Shub scheme 
[21] as these schemes are oriented towards true random number generation.  
 6. Conclusion 
Security and key management techniques related to the IoT have not been sufficient in current systems. This 
calls for the requirement to secure every component of an IoT system, otherwise it could lead to information 
leakage from the system. This will also affect the confidence of people involved with using these systems. 
Therefore, the presented IoT system in this paper tackles the problem of security from different angles.  
First, confidentiality and data-authentication are added using the AES-GCM 256-bit cipher, which 
outperforms other schemes as seen in Table IV. Second, key management schemes are included with periodic key 
updates, command-based key updates and key-generation features. These schemes are supported by ECDH, 
HMAC and HKDF standards that outperform other schemes mentioned in this paper [18]. Third, the PRNG from 
Contiki’s ‘C’ library is analysed using the NIST’s statistical test suite [42]. This provided approaches for seeding 
the PRNG to improve its randomness, thereby, giving more insight into the importance of random number 
generators in key-management. 
To conclude, the system presented in this paper provides a high level of security with cloud connectivity for 
IoT enabled devices. In addition, a working implementation on different technologies i.e. openmote, Intel Edison, 
Cloud and PC was presented. 
Future Work 
In the future, it is planned to incorporate TLS/SSL security on the cloud side of the system as this will add 
additional authentication security for the PC and the Gateway. This will ensure that the Gateway recognises the 
identity of the PC sending commands to the IoT network.  This will assist in the prevention of address-spoofing 
and replay attacks. 
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Fig. 1 End-to-End Secure IoT system:  Communications standards used and security implemented 
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Fig. 2. Work Flow Diagram for the system - I 
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Fig. 3. Work Flow Diagram for the system - II 
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Fig. 4. ECDH between router and sensors. 
  
  
Fig. 5. Key Update between the subscribed PC and the Router R using HKDF. 
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 Table I. Related Work Comparison 
Related Work 
Ref. 
Scheme Used Frequency 
(MHz) 
Time 
(ms) 
Energy 
(mJ) 
[18] ECDH 7.37 -- 42 
[40] ECDH 13 2718.35 80.05 
Our System ECDH 16 682.6 21.49 
[17,41]  RSA-1024* 14.7456 26.494 1.8 
AES-128-
CBC* 
10.44 0.6 
Our System AES-256-
GCM 
16 0.132 2.25
2
 
[15] S3K (DTLS 
based) 
32 511.65 to 
711.11 
0.2 to 1 
Our System HKDF 16 1.2294 0.049 
 
1 Calculated using E = V * I * t equation, where V = 3V, and I was retrieved from datasheet. 
2 Calculated using E = V * I * t equation, where V = 3.28V and I was measured using Agilent 66321D device [43]. 
* Datasheet values 
 
  
 Table II. ECDH Phase I between Router R and Cluster of Sensors S 
Router R Cluster of Sensors S 
Choose Random Secret => Generate private key kr Private Key kc pre-loaded 
Calculate public key Qr = kr.G*  Calculate public key Qc = kc.G**  
Broadcast Qr to the cluster of sensors S’ CH of these sensors sends (unicasts) Qc to the Router 
R’’ 
G is the generator point of elliptic curve secp256r1           *Fig .4, Point 1, **Fig. 4, Point 3 
   ’Fig. 4, Point 2, ’’Fig. 4, Point 4 
 
 
  
 Table III: Key Management Techniques Analysis 
 
 ECDH 
(Openmote 
16 MHz)1 
ECDH in [40] 
(imote2 
13MHz)2 
ECDH in [18] 
(Atmel 128) @ 
7.37 MHz) 3 
HKDF4 HMAC4 
Libraries ECC (built-in 
Contiki) 
TinyECC -- HMAC 
(custom-built) 
SHA 256  
(built-in 
Contiki) 
Total Time 
(ms) 
682.6 2718.35 1639 - 1743 1.2294 0.328 
Clock Cycles 
(*106) 
10.912 35.334 12.08 – 12.85 0.019 0.005 
Time for each 
stage 
(ms) 
N/A Initialization: 
0.04 
-- -- 
 
Set Key: 0.0226 
Round 1: 343 
 
Round 2: 339.6 
Key-Establish: 
2718.31 
-- Extract: 0.599 
 
Expand: 0.630 
Initialization: 
0.0466 
 
Process: 0.281 
      
Energy  21.49mJ 80.05mJ 42mJ 0.049mJ 0.013mJ 
Notes ECC hardware 
accelerator 
-- -- Software + SHA 
hardware 
accelerator 
Software + SHA 
hardware 
accelerator 
1No optimizations, 2Optimizations Disabled, 3NIST P-192 Curve, 4Custom build  
  
 Table IV: AES Analysis 
Platform  Openmote 
AES – GCM – 256  
@16MHz 
(5 bytes’ data) 
Waspmote AES–128 CBC 
Zero padding 
@ 14.7456MHz 
[17] [41] 
Waspmote AES-256 
CBC Zero padding 
@ 14.7456MHz 
[41] 
Metrics  
Libraries AES (built-in Contiki) AES (built-in Wasp mote) 
Total Time  
(ms) 
0.132 10.44 10.76 
Time for 
Decrypt stage (ms) 
0.0752 3.21 3.89 
Time for Encrypt stage 
(ms) 
0.0569 7.23 6.87 
Current 
(mA) 
5.2 7.4 to 64.9 22.4 
Notes AES hardware accelerator Hardware + Software Hardware + Software 
 
  
 Table V. PRNGS Scenarios 
 Initial seeding rand() range Remark 
Scenario 1 No seeding 0 to RAND_MAX 
Results stored as 
characters, where every 
character corresponds to 1 
byte 
Scenario 2 
Using srand: 
srand( rand() % 256 ) 0 to RTIMER_NOW
 
Results stored as 
characters, where every 
character corresponds to 1 
byte. 
Scenario 3 
Values (µ) from 
Accelerometer Sensor 
0 to µ 
Too much time 
consumption (261 ms) * 
Scenario 4 
Power Values (β) obtained 
from Contiki’s powertrace 
[44] 
0 to β 
Power values do not vary 
considerably for the 
scenario to work 
*Time taken is large as the sensor is calibrated using 'adxl346.configure(ADXL346_CALIB_OFFSET, 0)' function 
  
 Table VI. NIST Statistical Test Suite Results  
(P-value shown in percentage) 
 
Tests Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Frequency 21.33% 53.4% 0% 
Block Frequency 91.14% 53.4% 0% 
Cumulative Sum 73.99% 73.99% 0% 
Runs 73.99% 91.1% 0% 
Longest Run 73.99% 99.14% 0% 
Rank 73.99% 21.3% 0% 
FFT 6.68% 53.4% 0.04% 
Linear Complexity 6.68% 53.4% 53.4% 
Time Consumed 0.42ms 0.42ms 261ms 
 
